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In the last decade, great progress has been made in characterizing the accumulation of neural information during simple unitary
perceptual decisions. However, much less is known about how sequentially presented evidence is integrated over time for successful
decision making. The aim of this study was to study the mechanisms of sequential decision making in humans. In a magnetoencepha-
lography (MEG) study, we presented healthy volunteers with sequences of centrally presented arrows. Sequence length varied between
one and five arrows, and the accumulated directions of the arrows informed the subject about which hand to use for a button press at the
endof the sequence (e.g., LRLRRshould result in a right-handpress).Mathematicalmodeling suggested thatnonlinear accumulationwas
the rational strategy for performing this task in the presence of no or little noise, whereas quasilinear accumulation was optimal in the
presence of substantial noise. MEG recordings showed a correlate of evidence integration over parietal and central cortex that was
inversely related to the amount of accumulated evidence (i.e., whenmore evidence was accumulated, neural activity for new stimuli was
attenuated). Thismodulationof activity likely reflects a top–down influenceon sensoryprocessing, effectively constraining the influence
of sensory information on the decision variable over time. The results indicate that, when making decisions on the basis of sequential
information, the human nervous system integrates evidence in a nonlinear manner, using the amount of previously accumulated infor-
mation to constrain the accumulation of additional evidence.
Introduction
In the last decade, great progress has beenmade in characterizing
the forward flow of neural information during simple perceptual
decisions. Neurophysiological studies in monkeys have shown
how parietal areas accumulate evidence during perceptual deci-
sions.When a decision is expressed through amovement, there is
an accumulation of activity related to the decision process in the
cortical area that guides the motor action (Platt and Glimcher,
1999; Gold and Shadlen, 2000; Schall, 2001; Cisek and Kalaska,
2005; Gold and Shadlen, 2007). Similarly, imaging studies in hu-
mans showed that, when subjects make perceptual decisions about
an object category, neuronal activity in category-specific areas grad-
ually increases with increasing sensory evidence (Philiastides and
Sajda, 2006; Kaiser et al., 2007), while the dorsolateral prefrontal
cortexmay integrate the output of these sensory regions tomake the
decision (Heekeren et al., 2004, 2006).
Although much has been learned about decisions on single
percepts, much less is known about how multiple sources of ev-
idence are combined over time to guide decision making. Con-
sider the situation we face when deciding whether or not to cross
the street. Typically, we sequentially acquire different sources of
information (“Is the traffic light green? What is the distance/
speed of the cars approaching?”) and combine these sources of
evidence, giving each of them a particular weight (e.g., informa-
tion about the speed of the car may be more important than the
traffic light). A recent study explored the neurophysiology of this
type of sequential decisions (Yang and Shadlen, 2007). Monkeys
learned to probabilistically associate shapes with one of two tar-
gets. During sequential presentation of the shapes, neurons in the
LIP (lateral intraparietal area) showed responses consistent with
these neurons combining the information from all cues over
time, potentially by calculating the “log-likelihood ratio” (LLR)
in favor of one response over the other, an optimal strategy for
probabilistic inference.
Although the study of Yang and Shadlen shows that monkeys
can combine sources of evidence over time, it remains a question
how this information is integrated. The aim of this study was to
study the mechanisms of sequential decision making in humans,
contrasting several potential strategies that can be used for inte-
grating evidence. We designed a task in which a sequence of
arrow shapes was shown to the subject. Sequence length varied
between 1 and 5. The subject’s task was to decide on the predom-
inant direction of the arrows as soon as a go cue appeared (see Fig.
1). We tracked neural activity using magnetoencephalography
(MEG) during the sequential presentation of these cues that in-
formed the subject about the correct decision. We distinguish
between three strategies that could be used to solve the task:
simple addition/subtraction of each of the shapes (“naive” accu-
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mulation), computing the LLR, and a variant of the latter that we
call “mental logic.” These three strategies make different predic-
tions about how new evidence is integrated when previous evi-
dence has already biased the decision.We present amathematical
model that shows how these three strategies emerge naturally
from an optimal Bayesian observer that combines information
over time under various levels of stimulus uncertainty, and be-
havioral and MEG data that suggests how human subjects com-
bine information over time.
Materials andMethods
Participants. Fourteen healthy participants (11 males, 3 females; age,
mean  SD, 28  3 years) participated in the experiment. None of the
participants had a history of neurological or psychiatric disorders. All
participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. The study was
approved by the regional ethics committee (Hoˆpital de Biceˆtre, Paris,
France), and a written informed consent was obtained from the subjects
according to the Declaration of Helsinki. The experiment was part of a
general research program on functional neuroimaging of the human
brain, which was sponsored by the Atomic Energy Commission (Denis
Le Bihan).
Stimuli. The experimental stimuli were leftward and rightward point-
ing arrows (Fig. 1). Stimuli were black, presented on a gray background,
and subtended visual angles of 2.1 1.0°. Stimuli were presented using a
PC running Presentation software (Neurobehavioral Systems) and pro-
jected on a screen that was70 cm away from the subject.
Experimental design. Subjects were shown sequences of one to five
successive foveal arrows. Each trial started with a red fixation square,
displayed for an average duration of 2000 ms (between 1750 and 2250
ms), followed by the sequence of arrows. Each arrow was presented for
100ms, followed by a blank of 200ms. At the end of each arrow sequence,
the fixation square turned green, and the subject had to decide as fast as
possible whether the predominant direction of the arrow stimuli was left
or right, by pressing a button with their left or right hand (Fig. 1A).
Sequences of length 1–4 were included to encourage subjects to keep
actively integrating information during the whole epoch, instead of wait-
ing until all arrows had appeared (which could be the strategy of choice
when subjects know beforehand how many stimuli will be presented),
but these trials were not otherwise included in the analysis. Figure 1B
shows a diagram of the amount of accumulated evidence as a function of
time, illustrating all the possible transitions during the task.
To encourage continuous updating of information, subjects had to
respond within a 500 ms time window. Visual feedback about the sub-
ject’s performance was given on a trial-by-trial basis. Before data acqui-
sition, participants engaged in 60 training trials to get acquainted with
the task. During MEG data acquisition, subjects engaged in six task
blocks, each block consisting of 120 trials. Total duration of the experi-
ment was70 min.
Mathematical model of information processing during the task. To ex-
amine whether behavior and electrophysiological variables track optimal
decision variables of the task, we constructed a mathematical model of
the evolution of the LLR of one of the responses being correct (vs the
other) at each time step. The model takes into account both the uncer-
tainty about the forthcoming stimuli (given that all sequences of five
arrows are equiprobable), and the additional uncertainty associated with
the probability p of correctly perceiving each stimulus.
Mathematically, we describe this stimulus by a series ofnnumbers {xi},
each of which is either1 or 1. The task requires pressing right if(xi)
0, and left otherwise. Our goal is to compute P(Rx1 . . . xk), whenR is the
right-hand response and xk is the kth stimulus. The log-likelihood ratio
will then simply be as follows: LLR  log10[P(Rx1 . . . xk)/(1  P(R
x1 . . . xk))]. Consider first the case when p  1 (arrows are always cor-
rectly perceived). Computing P(Rx1 . . . xk), where x1 . . . xk is a given
initial sequence of k arrows (k n), amounts to counting, among all the
possible sequences of the remaining n  k stimuli, the proportion of
those that have a rightward response. Call the sum of the first k arrows sk.
After k arrows have been presented, the tree of possible stimuli is reduced
to 2n  k possibilities, whose remaining sum sn  k is distributed accord-
ing to a binomial distribution [given simply by the (n  k)th line of the
Pascal triangle]. Noting thatP(Rx1 . . . xk)P(Rsk)P(sn k	 sk 0)
P(sn  k  sk), we see that the desired probability can be obtained by
computing the proportion of trials, in the (n  k)th line of the Pascal
triangle, that exceed the midpoint minus the current sum sk.
Note, however, that, with p 1, the LLR will rise to infinity when the
subject acquires certainty about his response. A more realistic model
assumes that subjects have a fixed probability p 1 of correctly perceiv-
ing each arrow because of noise in the sensory signal and inference. The
revised theory therefore distinguishes the arrows {Xi} objectively pre-
sented on a given trial, from the perceived arrows {xi}. The optimal
observer perceives the {xi} and attempts to compute P(Rx1 . . . xk), tak-
ing into account that some of the xi may have been misperceived. Thus,
he needs to consider all the possible original stimuli X1 . . . Xk that could
have led to his percept, each weighted by their probability of having been
perceived P(X1 . . . Xkx1 . . . xk) as follows: P(Rx1 . . . xk)  Sumall X1..k
P(RX1 . . . Xk) P(X1 . . . Xkx1 . . . xk). This sum is easily computed as
P(Rx1 . . . xk) is known from the previous theory; it is P(RSk), where
Sk sum(Xk), and P(X1 . . . Xkx1 . . . xk) is p
a(1 p)k  a, where a is the
number of arrows in common between X and x.
From these equations, a MatLab program was written to compute the
LLR for all possible input sequences. For simplicity, we only report here
the results of simulations at three levels of perceptual certainty: absolute
certainty ( p 1), high certainty ( p 0.95), and low certainty ( p 0.6).
MEG measurements. Ongoing brain activity was recorded using a
whole-head MEG with 275 axial gradiometers (VSM/CTF Systems).
Data were collected at 12 kHz and downsampled at 600 Hz. To prevent
aliasing, an eighth-order elliptic infinite impulse response filter was used
with a cutoff at one-fourth of the sampling frequency, a 0.1 dB pass band
ripple, and 120 dB attenuation at theNyquist frequency as an antialiasing
Figure 1. Task setup and diagram. A, Subjects were shown sequences of one to five arrows.
Eacharrowwas shown for 100ms followedbya200msblank screen, leading toa stimulusonset
asynchrony between two arrows of 300 ms. At the end of each arrow sequence, the fixation
square turned green, and subjects had to decide as fast as possible whether the predominant
direction of the arrow stimuli was left or right, by pressing a buttonwith their left or right hand.
B, The cumulative number arrows favoring one or the other direction, which is used here as a
proxy for accumulated evidence (see mathematical model), is plotted as a function of time.
Subjects startwith no evidence for either direction (0, in black). Each incoming arrowmoves the
sumupor down in the diagram. The transitions of the example sequence ofA are shown in solid
lines in thediagram. States atwhichnodecision canbemade yet are shaded light gray,whereas
states at which enough information has been accrued for a decision are shaded dark gray.
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filter. Head localization was monitored continuously during the experi-
ment using coils that were placed at the cardinal points of the head
(nasion, left and right ear canal). The magnetic fields produced by these
coils were used to measure the position of the subject’s head with respect
to theMEG sensor array. In addition to theMEG, the electro-oculogram
(EOG) was recorded from the supraorbital and infraorbital ridge of the
left eye for the subsequent artifact rejection. Also, the electromyogram
(EMG) and electrocardiogram (ECG) were recorded using 10-mm-
diameterAg–AgCl surface electrodes. EMGelectrodeswere placed on the
left and right forearm, in a “belly–tendon” arrangement, after standard
skin preparation.
Data analysis. All data analysis was performed using the FieldTrip
toolbox developed at Donders Institute for Brain, Cognition and Behav-
iour (http://www.ru.nl/fcdonders/fieldtrip) using MatLab 7 (Math-
works). Data were checked for artifacts using a semiautomatic routine
that helped detecting and rejecting eye blinks, muscle artifacts, and
jumps in theMEG signal caused by the superconducting quantum inter-
ference device (SQUID) electronics. Subsequently, independent compo-
nent analysis (Bell and Sejnowski, 1995) was used to remove any heart
artifacts and eye movements not rejected by the semiautomatic routine
(Jung et al., 2000). First, 275 independent components (ICs) were esti-
mated from the full dataset. Then, ICs that had both a strong correlation
with the ECG or EOG channels and a topography that was consistent
with the corresponding ocular or heartbeat artifact were removed from
the data set. Finally, we low-pass filtered the data using a two-pass But-
terworth filter with a filter order of 6, and a frequency cutoff of 40 Hz.
For the subsequent analysis, we only considered correct trials with the
longest sequence length (i.e., consisting of five arrows).We calculated an
estimate of the planar gradient for the data analysis on the sensor level
(Bastiaansen and Kno¨sche, 2000). The horizontal and vertical compo-
nents of the planar gradients were calculated for each sensor using the
signals from the neighboring sensors, thus approximating the signal
measured byMEG systems with planar gradiometers. This approach has
been successfully applied in previous MEG studies (Bauer et al., 2006;
Osipova et al., 2006; de Lange et al., 2008). The planar field gradient
simplifies the interpretation of the sensor-level data because themaximal
signal typically is located above the source (Hamalainen et al., 1993).
We used a multiple regression analysis to isolate the unique contribu-
tions of the following experimental factors: (1) the number of accumu-
lated arrows at stimulus onset [hereafter called “evidence” for simplicity,
given its theoretical correlation with LLR;
range (0–5)], (2) whether the stimulus
changed direction with respect to the preced-
ing stimulus or not [“change”; 0 (no change) or
1 (change)], and (3) the temporal position in
the sequence at which the stimulus was pre-
sented [“time”; range (1–5)]. Although evi-
dence and change are orthogonal with respect to
each other, there is a degree of correlation be-
tween evidence and time (r 0.42), necessitating
a multiple regression approach to discern the
unique contributions of each of these factors
from their commonly explained variance.
We established the significance of the differ-
ences in field strength for each experimental
factor at the cluster level, using a nonparamet-
ric cluster randomization test (Nichols and
Holmes, 2002; Maris and Oostenveld, 2007).
This test effectively controls the type I error
rate in situations involving multiple compari-
sons (such as 275 sensors) by clustering neigh-
boring sensor pairs that exhibit the same effect.
The randomization method first identified
sensors whose t statistics exceeded a critical
value when comparing two conditions sensor
by sensor ( p 0.01, two-sided). In the second
step, to correct for multiple comparisons, con-
tiguous sensors (separated by5 cm) that ex-
ceeded the critical value (as defined in the first
step) were considered a cluster. The cluster-
level test statistic was defined from the sum of the t values of the sensors
in a given cluster. The cluster with themaximum sumwas used in the test
statistics. The type I error rate for the complete set of 275 sensors was
controlled by evaluating the cluster level test statistic under the random-
ization null distribution of the maximum cluster-level test statistic. This
was obtained by randomizing the data between the two conditions across
multiple subjects calculating t statistics for the new set of clusters. A
reference distribution of cluster-level t statistics was created from 2000
randomizations. The p value was estimated according to the proportion
of the randomization null distribution exceeding the observed maxi-
mum cluster-level test statistic (the so-called Monte Carlo p value). The
anatomical label of each reported cluster refers to the localization scheme
used for labeling the SQUID sensors (VSM/CTF Systems).
First, we assessed the effects of previous evidence and time on the
evoked fields just after stimulus onset [interval (0–50 ms)], where the
current arrow did not have time to impact on brain activity. This “base-
line” interval was physiologically motivated, for it takes 50 ms for a
visual stimulus to reach the cortex (Bullier and Nowak, 1995; Nowak et
al., 1995). To investigate how each new arrow influenced subsequent
stimulus processing, we assessed the effects of evidence, change, and time
on evoked fields in two time windows: early (150–225 ms) and late
(225–300 ms) after stimulus onset. Activity changes, over and above the
“baseline” activity level at stimulus onset, were obtained by subtracting
the average activity of the baseline interval (0–50 ms).
Results
Mathematical model of information processing during
the task
Figure 2 shows how the theoretical LLR evolves as a function of
time (the abscissa) and of the evidence provided by the different
types of sequential stimuli [the color of the curves: fromblack, no
evidence (equal number of left and right arrows), to red, five
arrows pointing in the same direction]. Interestingly, by chang-
ing the value of a single parameter, the uncertainty in the stimu-
lus, we obtain three qualitatively different types of behavior.
Under conditions of no noise in the system ( p  1), the LLR
“jumps” to an infinite amount of certainty about the decision to
make as soon as enough arrows have been observed that have the
Figure 2. Predictions frommathematical model. The LLR is plotted as a function of the amount of accumulated evidence
and three scenarios of perceptual uncertainty: complete perceptual certainty ( p  1) (A), high amount of perceptual
certainty ( p 0.95) (B), and low amount of perceptual certainty ( p 0.6) (C).
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same direction (Fig. 2A). After this point,
new information no longer changes the
decision certainty. This optimal strategy is
what we referred to as “mental logic” in
Introduction. It exploits all the informa-
tion available, including that about the
maximal sequence length. For instance, it
takes into account that, given amaximum
of five arrows, any set of three arrows
pointing in the same direction suffices to
obtain certainty, regardless of subsequent
stimuli.
When a small amount of noise is added
to the system ( p  0.95), the diagram
shows a nonlinear increase in the amount
of evidence at the moment that enough
stimuli have been observed with the same
direction (corresponding to achieving
“near-certainty”), but new stimuli can
still influence the LLR (Fig. 2B). Finally,
when there is a significant amount of
noise in the system ( p  0.6), the transi-
tion diagram becomes essentially tree-like,
as the LLR is essentially linearly increasing
with the sum of the arrows. This finding
indicates that a close approximation to
thetrueLLRcanbeobtainedbysimplyadding
or subtractinga fixedquantity fromarunning
total for each incoming arrow, and justifies
our use of this sum as a proxy for evidence in
the following analyses (Fig. 2C; compare with
Fig. 1B).
In summary, the theoretical analysis suggests that when per-
ceiving the arrows optimally and performing as perfect “noise-
less” logicians ( p  1), subjects should cease updating their
internal state for arrows arriving late in the sequence, whenever
the earlier arrows convey enough certainty. Mathematical
analysis, however, shows that a much simpler strategy of sim-
ply adding all incoming arrows can be optimal too, particu-
larly under conditions of faulty perception.
Behavioral results
Reaction times (RTs) decreased monotonically with longer se-
quence length (Fig. 3A) (T(1,13) 10.8; p 0.001), likely because
of the increasing probability of an impending go cue as a
function of sequence length. Moreover, subjects responded
faster when they had accumulated more evidence (Fig. 3A)
(T(1,13)  4.13; p  0.0012). Error rates were generally low
(mean SD, 6.0 2.3%), indicating that the subjects were well
able to perform the task. As can be seen in Figure 3B, the proba-
bility of responding left or right was modulated by the amount
and direction of the evidence accumulated (T(1,13)  72.3; p 
0.001). There was also an effect of arrow position on reaction
time, suggesting that later informationwas weighedmore heavily
than earlier information (Fig. 3C). When the evidence conveyed
by the fifth (last) stimulus was congruent with the final decision,
this led to a 51 ms RT gain (T(1,13)  8.82; p  0.001). Congru-
ence of the fourth stimulus also led to a RT gain, but of smaller
magnitude (17ms; T(1,13) 3.22; p 0.0067), whereas there was
no significant influence of congruence of the first three arrows
(all p 0.5). Post hoc tests show that the congruence effect of the
last arrow was observed when previous evidence was already suf-
ficient for forming a decision (evidence  2: T(1,13)  9.86, p 
0.001; evidence 4:T(1,13) 2.32, p 0.037). This behavior does
not correspond to purely logical decision making, since new in-
formation continued to influence behavioral performance after
the decision boundary has been crossed. The data further showed
a significantly larger influence of arrow congruence when previ-
ous evidence was lower (evidence 2 vs evidence 4: T(1,13)
3.40, p  0.0048). Therefore, the results are also not consistent
with a simple summation model, since new information was
weighted differently for different levels of previous evidence.
The intermediate Bayesian model did capture this behavior
rather well. This model showed no differential change in LLR
for different levels of evidence at either very low or very high
levels of sensory noise, but a maximal difference in informa-
tion conveyed by the incongruent stimulus between different
levels of evidence at an intermediate reliability of p 0.84 (see
supplemental Fig. S1, available at www.jneurosci.org as sup-
plemental material).
Parietal and central activity are inversely related to
accumulated evidence
We first investigated whether the amount of previously accu-
mulated evidence (evidence) influences neural activity levels
at the onset of processing new stimuli. For this, we compared
activity at stimulus onset (0 –50 ms after stimulus presenta-
tion) as a function of the amount of previously accumulated
evidence. Figure 4A shows sensors that showed a significant
modulation of neural activity at stimulus onset as a function of
evidence. As can be seen from Figure 4B, an inverse relation-
ship is observed: when more evidence has been accumulated,
neural activity before the upcoming stimulus is lower. This
effect is significant over central (cluster size 18; cluster T
Figure 3. Behavioral results suggesting that subjects accumulate incoming evidence. A, RTs as a function of accumulated
evidence and sequence length.B, Subject’s responses as a function of accumulated evidence for a rightward response. C, Influence
of the position of the arrow in the sequence on RT. The later arrows (fourth and fifth in the sequence) showed a larger contribution
to subject’s RT than arrows presented early in the sequence. Error bars indicate SEM.
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62.6; pcorrected 0.0005) and right parietal sensors (cluster size 7;
cluster T 27.6; pcorrected 0.0075).
We then investigated whether evidence also influenced the
transient activity induced by the upcoming stimulus (over and
above the baseline shift). For this, we subtracted from each trace
the baseline at the onset of the stimulus (0–50 ms after stimulus
presentation). As can be seen from Figure 5, the increase in activ-
ity induced by each stimulus was lower when more evidence has
been accumulated. This effect was significant in central sensors,
both in the interval 150–225 ms (cluster size  5; cluster T 
16.9; pcorrected 0.034) and 225–300 ms (cluster size 6; cluster
T 24.4; pcorrected 0.017).
Similarly to the behavioral analysis, we also compared the
effect of congruency of the last arrow between different levels of
evidence (evidence 2 vs evidence 4).When the last arrowwas
congruent with previous evidence, this resulted in a trend of
larger frontal activity when evidence was lower (evidence 2 vs
evidence 4: cluster size 3; clusterT 10.7; pcorrected 0.079),
in the interval 225–300 ms after arrow onset. This frontal cluster
had a similar topography as the sensors showing a main effect of
time (supplemental Fig. S2A, available at www.jneurosci.org as
supplemental material) (see also Fig. 7A) (see below). Incongru-
ency of the last arrow resulted in a significantly larger right pari-
etal activity when evidence was higher in the interval 225–300ms
after arrow onset (evidence 4 vs evidence 2: cluster size 9;
cluster T  30.9; pcorrected  0.0055). This parietal cluster had a
similar topography as the sensors showing the main effect of
evidence (supplemental Fig. S2B, available at www.jneurosci.org
as supplemental material) (Fig. 5A). This pattern is in good cor-
respondence with the behavioral results, insofar as it shows that
(1) new information continued to influence accumulation-
related neural activity after the decision boundary had been
crossed and (2) there was a differential influence of information
under different levels of evidence.
Occipital and fronto-central regions react to a change in
stimulus direction
Next, we looked at neural activity changes as a function of
whether the stimulus conveyed a change in the direction of evi-
dence (change) with respect to the preceding stimulus—a behav-
iorally relevant factor that slowed response times. As can be seen
from Figure 6, a change in the direction of evidence resulted in a
large amplification of neural activity. This amplification was vis-
ible after 150–225ms in bilateral occipital sensors (cluster size
63; cluster T  236.8; pcorrected  0.0001) and was then propa-
gated to central and frontal sensors, where it led to a significant
difference after 225–300 ms after stimulus onset (cluster size 
140; cluster T 587.4; pcorrected 0.0001). It is noteworthy that
the larger response for change happens at all levels of evidence
accumulated. Indeed, well after the decision boundary has been
crossed, a change in evidence still leads to a sizeable increase in
neural activity, in both occipital and central-frontal sensors.
Figure 4. Amount of previous evidence determines neural activity at stimulus onset.
A, Grand average of the topography of the influence of previously accumulated evidence (evi-
dence) on brain activity at the onset of the incoming stimulus (0–50ms). Themarkers indicate
clusters of significant regression weights ( p 0.05, corrected for multiple comparisons). The
right parietal cluster is denotedby “	,” and the central cluster is denotedby “o.”B, Time course
of sensors showing a significant influence of evidence on activity at stimulus onset. For illustra-
tion purposes, as well as to be able to dissociate between the effects of evidence and change
(see below), we only plot trials in which there was no stimulus change. It can be seen that both
at the onset of the third stimulus (600 ms), the fourth stimulus (900 ms) and the fifth stimulus
(1200 ms) there is overall lower activity when more evidence has been accumulated.
Figure 5. Amount of accumulated evidence changes processing of new stimuli. A, Grand
averageof the topographyof the influenceof accumulatedevidence (evidence) onbrain activity
changes induced by the new stimulus, at two time intervals (150–225 and 225–300 ms after
stimulus onset). The dots indicate clusters of significant regression weights ( p 0.05, cor-
rected for multiple comparisons). B, Time course of the sensors showing a significant influence
of evidenceonactivity changes.Moreevidence leads toattenuatedactivity changes for the third
stimulus (750–900 ms), the fourth stimulus (1050–1200 ms), and the fifth stimulus (1350–
1500 ms). Other conventions are as in Figure 4.
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Frontal signals are enhanced and
posterior signals are attenuated as a
function of time
Finally, we looked at neural activity as a
function of time (time). In general, virtu-
ally all sensors showed a significant ramp-
ing up of activity at stimulus onset as a
function of time (cluster size 273; clus-
terT 1602; pcorrected 0.0001). Looking
at the influence of time on changes in ac-
tivity induced by the stimulus (over and
above baseline shifts), we found that oc-
cipital signals were suppressed over time,
whereas frontal signals became stronger
(Fig. 7). This led to a significant negative
regression over posterior sensors 150–225
ms after stimulus onset (cluster size 10;
cluster T 36.1; pcorrected 0.0045) and a
significant positive regression over frontal
sensors both 150–225 ms after stimulus
onset (cluster size 13; cluster T 47.5;
pcorrected  0.0005) and 225–300 ms after
stimulus onset (cluster size  6; cluster
T 22.7; pcorrected 0.024).
Discussion
In this study, we have investigated how
humanobservers accumulate evidence for
one of two choices as the decision process
is gradually constrained by serially incom-
ing sensory information. We contrasted
three possibilities for evidence accumula-
tion: mental logic, Bayesian integration,
and addition/subtraction. Using a simple
mathematical model, we found that these
three types of behavior could arise from
an optimal decision process under differ-
ent levels of noise. Behaviorally, response
times and error rates supported a nonlin-
ear but continuous accumulation process,
extending beyond the point at which log-
ical reasoning sufficed to reach a decision.
MEG recordings showed a correlate of ev-
idence accumulation over parietal and
central cortex that was inversely related to
the amount of accumulated evidence.
This suggests these areas upregulate their
response under situations of increasing
uncertainty. We also observed larger ac-
tivity over occipital and fronto-central
cortex when the stimulus conflicted with
the directly preceding stimulus—again,
regardless of whether that change was log-
ically irrelevant or not. This activity in-
crease was regardless of the amount of
evidence accumulated. Finally, as the de-
cision process unfolded over time, frontal
cortex increased its activity while occipito-
parietal activity was suppressed. Together,
the results highlight top–down and bot-
tom–up components of evidence accumu-
lation during sequential decision making,
which we will discuss below.
Figure 6. Change in evidence leads to increased activity. A, B, Grand average of the topography of the influence of a
change in arrow direction (change) on brain activity change, at two time intervals [150 –225 ms (A) and 225–300 ms (B)
after stimulus onset]. The dots indicate clusters of significant regression weights ( p  0.05, corrected for multiple
comparisons). C, D, Time course of posterior sensors showing a significant influence of change after 150 –225 ms (C), and
of frontal sensors showing a significant influence of change after 225–300ms (D). For illustration purposes, as well as to be
able to dissociate between evidence and change (see below), we present one level of evidence for each time window.
Figure 7. Occipital activity attenuates and frontal activity increases over time. A, B, Grand average of the topography of the
influence of time on changes in brain activity induced by the stimulus, at two time intervals [150–225ms (A) and 225–300ms (B)
after stimulus onset]. The dots indicate clusters of significant regression weights ( p 0.05, corrected for multiple comparisons).
C, Time course of occipital sensors showing a significant negative relationship with time after 150–225 ms. D, Time course of
frontal sensors showing a significant positive relationship with time both after 150–225 ms and after 225–300 ms. Other con-
ventions are as in Figure 4.
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Parietal and central signals are inversely related to nonlinear
evidence accumulation
There was a gradual buildup of activity with each incoming stim-
ulus, consistent with the concept of accumulation of evidence.
However, both the amount of activity (Fig. 4) and change in
activity for eachnew stimulus (Fig. 5)were inversely related to the
amount of previous evidence accumulated. In other words, when
a larger amount of evidence had already been accumulated, new
sensory evidence had a lower impact on brain activity in parietal
and central areas. This indirect signature of evidence accumula-
tion is quite distinct from the bottom–up sensory evidence accu-
mulation that shows a positive relationship between activation
strength and amount of evidence accumulated and has been pre-
viously observed using single-cell recordings in macaques (Platt
and Glimcher, 1999; Shadlen and Newsome, 2001; Yang and
Shadlen, 2007). It is also opposite to what would be expected
from the mathematical model, which shows larger changes in
LLR for arrows that are presented later in the sequence. We sug-
gest that this new observation of a negative modulation of brain
activity with evidence likely reflects a top–down influence on
sensory processing, effectively constraining the influence of sen-
sory information on the decision variable. It is well known that
internal state variables like expectation, bias, and reward can all
help to reduce the computational load imposed by the informa-
tion in the outside world (Gilbert and Sigman, 2007; Nienborg
andCumming, 2009; Rushworth et al., 2009). These internal state
variables can subsequently impact visual and attentional process-
ing (Murray et al., 2002; Summerfield and Koechlin, 2008). As
such, our data are consistent with the hypothesis that subjects
formed expectations about the outcome of each trial based on the
basis of initial evidence and used this information to modulate
the amount of resources dedicated to the stimuli that were sub-
sequently presented. Although the current set of data was not
optimally suited to quantitatively link themathematicalmodel to
the observedMEG responses, this limitation could be potentially
overcome by using a larger set of shapes that convey probabilistic
information about trial outcome (cf. Yang and Shadlen, 2007). It
would be interesting to see whether and how previous expecta-
tions change the monotonic relationship between LLR and neu-
ral activity that has been observed in these settings.
Changing the evidence leads to amplification of occipital and
fronto-central cortex
When the direction of a stimulus was opposite to the direction of
the preceding stimulus, this resulted in a large increase in activity
that started in occipital cortex and spread to central and frontal
regions. Interestingly, this activity difference was equally present
for all levels of accumulated evidence. Although it is possible that
the larger response to a different stimulus can be partly explained
as a sensory phenomenon [e.g., repetition suppression (Grill-
Spector et al., 2006)], the large spread of activity to central and
frontal areas suggests that it is not merely a sensory effect. It is
possible that the larger activity for a change in stimulus direction
is caused by a form of task switching, either because of the change
from addition of evidence to subtraction of evidence, or equiva-
lently, to the change from engaging one accumulator to the other.
Future studies that manipulate changes in accumulation inde-
pendently from stimulus identity are required to dissociate be-
tween these possibilities.
Timematters during sequential decision making
There were opposite effects of the passage of time on occipito-
parietal and frontal sensors (Fig. 7). Although occipito-parietal
responses to stimuli were attenuated over time, frontal signals
showed increasing responses to new stimuli, suggesting that in-
formation that was acquired at a later moment in time was
weighted more heavily in these regions. There was an interesting
behavioral counterpart to this phenomenon: congruency of the
first three stimuli with the final decision had no effect on reaction
times, whereas there was a moderate effect (17 ms) for the fourth
stimulus and a large effect (51ms) for the fifth stimulus (Fig. 3C).
The sensory attenuation in posterior cortex and enhancement of
medial frontal cortex may therefore be the neural counterpart
and explanation for this behaviorally observed “recency” effect.
Mental logic or accumulation?
The finding that a change in evidence led to a large increase in
activity, in both sensory and decision-related areas, and regard-
less of the amount of evidence accumulated (Fig. 6) is clearly not
in line with a “mental logic”model, in which conflicting evidence
should have no influence after the decision threshold has been
crossed. Nevertheless, it is also obvious from the data that the
amount of previously accumulated evidence had a large impact
on processing of new stimuli (Fig. 5). This argues against a simple
addition model: if new evidence is simply added or subtracted,
the accumulation process should not interact with its history.
Our data indicate that the impact of congruent or incongruent
information on brain activity and behavior depends on the
amount of already accrued information. The fact that new stimuli
lead to a larger response under conditions of increasing uncer-
tainty suggests that the brain weighs the attentional resources
according to the certainty it has about the outcome. Together,
our results offer no support for the mental logic model, and gen-
erally support the view that incoming evidence is continuously
accumulated, but with two violations from a purely additive
model: new information is differentially weighted depending on
the previously accumulated evidence, whereas recent conflicting
information can affect the decision process even after the deci-
sion boundary should have been crossed.
Our results could be interpreted as suggesting that human
subjects are inherently irrational and let their decisions be influ-
enced by irrelevant variables. However, our paradigm, with one
arrow every 300 ms, also leaves open the possibility that subjects
were simply unable to deploy their logical reasoning abilities at
this high speed, and therefore resorted to a faster but less precise
accumulation system. We deem it likely that, if the current task
was slowed, additional logical inference processes would become
deployed, as they were indeed observed in a related but slower
sequential logic task studied with functional magnetic resonance
imaging (Landmann et al., 2007).
In conclusion, we demonstrated that sequential decisionmak-
ing in humans proceeds by accumulation of serially incoming
evidence, as originally reported in monkeys (Yang and Shadlen,
2007). However, our indirect noninvasive MEG recordings were
unable to pick up the increasing neural signals that directly reflect
this evidence accumulation process. Instead, our results showed a
new and unexpected effect: the negative impact of previous evi-
dence accumulation on brain activation level and on incoming
sensory-evoked activation. These processes complement the well
described forward flow of neural information during decision
making and indicate that, when making decisions on the basis of
sequential information, the human nervous system uses the
amount of previously accumulated information to constrain the
accumulation of additional evidence.
de Lange et al. • Sequential Decision Making in the Human Brain J. Neurosci., January 13, 2010 • 30(2):731–738 • 737
References
BastiaansenMC,Kno¨sche TR (2000) Tangential derivativemapping of axial
MEG applied to event-related desynchronization research. Clin Neuro-
physiol 111:1300–1305.
Bauer M, Oostenveld R, Peeters M, Fries P (2006) Tactile spatial attention
enhances gamma-band activity in somatosensory cortex and reduces low-
frequency activity in parieto-occipital areas. J Neurosci 26:490–501.
Bell AJ, Sejnowski TJ (1995) An information-maximization approach to
blind separation and blind deconvolution. Neural Comput 7:1129–1159.
Bullier J, Nowak LG (1995) Parallel versus serial processing: new vistas on
the distributed organization of the visual system. Curr Opin Neurobiol
5:497–503.
Cisek P, Kalaska JF (2005) Neural correlates of reaching decisions in dorsal
premotor cortex: specification of multiple direction choices and final
selection of action. Neuron 45:801–814.
de Lange FP, Jensen O, Bauer M, Toni I (2008) Interactions between poste-
rior gamma and frontal alpha/beta oscillations during imagined actions.
Front Hum Neurosci 2:7.
Gilbert CD, Sigman M (2007) Brain states: top-down influences in sensory
processing. Neuron 54:677–696.
Gold JI, Shadlen MN (2000) Representation of a perceptual decision in de-
veloping oculomotor commands. Nature 404:390–394.
Gold JI, ShadlenMN (2007) The neural basis of decisionmaking. Annu Rev
Neurosci 30:535–574.
Grill-Spector K, Henson R, Martin A (2006) Repetition and the brain: neu-
ral models of stimulus-specific effects. Trends Cogn Sci 10:14–23.
Hamalainen M, Hari R, Ilmoniemi R, Knuutila J, Lounasmaa O (1993)
Magnetoencephalography. Theory, instrumentation and applications to
the noninvasive study of brain function. Rev Mod Phys 65:413–497.
Heekeren HR, Marrett S, Bandettini PA, Ungerleider LG (2004) A general
mechanism for perceptual decision-making in the human brain. Nature
431:859–862.
Heekeren HR, Marrett S, Ruff DA, Bandettini PA, Ungerleider LG (2006)
Involvement of human left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex in perceptual
decisionmaking is independent of response modality. Proc Natl Acad Sci
U S A 103:10023–10028.
Jung TP, Makeig S, Westerfield M, Townsend J, Courchesne E, Sejnowski TJ
(2000) Removal of eye activity artifacts from visual event-related poten-
tials in normal and clinical subjects. Clin Neurophysiol 111:1745–1758.
Kaiser J, Lennert T, LutzenbergerW (2007) Dynamics of oscillatory activity
during auditory decision making. Cereb Cortex 17:2258–2267.
Landmann C, Dehaene S, Pappata S, Jobert A, Bottlaender M, Roumenov D,
Le Bihan D (2007) Dynamics of prefrontal and cingulate activity during
a reward-based logical deduction task. Cereb Cortex 17:749–759.
Maris E, Oostenveld R (2007) Nonparametric statistical testing of EEG- and
MEG-data. J Neurosci Methods 164:177–190.
Murray SO, Kersten D, Olshausen BA, Schrater P, Woods DL (2002) Shape
perception reduces activity in human primary visual cortex. Proc Natl
Acad Sci U S A 99:15164–15169.
Nichols TE, Holmes AP (2002) Nonparametric permutation tests for func-
tional neuroimaging: a primer with examples. HumBrainMapp 15:1–25.
Nienborg H, Cumming BG (2009) Decision-related activity in sensory neu-
rons reflects more than a neuron’s causal effect. Nature 459:89–92.
Nowak LG, Munk MH, Girard P, Bullier J (1995) Visual latencies in areas
V1 and V2 of the macaque monkey. Vis Neurosci 12:371–384.
Osipova D, Takashima A, Oostenveld R, Ferna´ndez G, Maris E, Jensen O
(2006) Theta and gamma oscillations predict encoding and retrieval of
declarative memory. J Neurosci 26:7523–7531.
Philiastides MG, Sajda P (2006) Temporal characterization of the neural
correlates of perceptual decision making in the human brain. Cereb Cor-
tex 16:509–518.
Platt ML, Glimcher PW (1999) Neural correlates of decision variables in
parietal cortex. Nature 400:233–238.
Rushworth MF, Mars RB, Summerfield C (2009) General mechanisms for
making decisions? Curr Opin Neurobiol 19:75–83.
Schall JD (2001) Neural basis of deciding, choosing and acting. Nat Rev
Neurosci 2:33–42.
Shadlen MN, NewsomeWT (2001) Neural basis of a perceptual decision in
the parietal cortex (area LIP) of the rhesus monkey. J Neurophysiol
86:1916–1936.
Summerfield C, Koechlin E (2008) A neural representation of prior infor-
mation during perceptual inference. Neuron 59:336–347.
Yang T, Shadlen MN (2007) Probabilistic reasoning by neurons. Nature
447:1075–1080.
738 • J. Neurosci., January 13, 2010 • 30(2):731–738 de Lange et al. • Sequential Decision Making in the Human Brain
